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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, Cornell University 2005
M.A. in Economics, Cornell University, 2004

AREAS OF INTEREST

Political Economics, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

2011 - Professor of Public Finance (W3), Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg
2010 - 2011 University Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Cambridge
Fellow of King's College, Cambridge
2008 - 2010 Junior Professor (W1), Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg
2005 - 2008 Research Associate, Max Planck Institute of Economics

PUBLICATIONS

Multilateral bargaining with subjective claims under majority vs. unanimity rule: An experiment (with Anna Merkel), *Journal of Economic Psychology* 95 (2023), 102601.
Promise keeping and reliance damage (with Arjun Sengupta), *European Economic Review* 152 (2023), 104344.
Legislative bargaining with costly communication (with Anna Merkel), *Public Choice* 183 (2020), 3-27
What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation (with L. Conraria and P. Magalhaes), *Public Choice* 140 (2019), 1-17
Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments (with L. Miller and M. Montero), *Games and Economic Behavior* 107 (2018), 60-92
Who never tells a lie? *Experimental Economics*, 20 (2017), 448-459
The dynamics of coalition formation - a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves (with J. Tremewan) *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 130 (2016), 33-46
Experimental Evidence that Quorum Rules Discourage Turnout and Promote Election Boycotts (with L. Conraria and P. Magalhaes), *Experimental Economics*, 19 (2016), 886-909
Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining (with Luis Miller), *European Journal*

of Political Economy, 37 (2015), 288-302

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism (with M. Kurino and D. Hugh-Jones). *Games and Economic Behavior*, 87 (2014), 367-380

Adaptive Preferences, Normative Individualism, and Individual Liberty: Comment, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 170 (2014), 43-48.

Playing hard to get: an economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior (with W. Schnedler), *European Economic Review*, 68 (2014), 106-115.

Decision costs in legislative bargaining: An experimental analysis (with Luis Miller), *Public Choice*, 155 (2013), 373-394.

Voting on a sharing norm in a dictator game, *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 31 (2010), 285-292.

Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations, *Econometrica*, 76 (2008), 1467-1480.

'One Man, One Dollar?' Campaign contribution limits, equal influence, and political communication, *Journal of Public Economics*, 92 (2008) 514-531.

UNDER REVIEW

Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining (with T. Miettinen)

Effects of decision rules in multilateral bargaining: Evidence from an unstructured experiment (with J. Tremewan) (R&R *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*)

WORK IN PROGRESS

Logrolling affects the relative performance of alternative q -majority rules: theory and experiments (with L. Charroin)

Multilateral Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (with D. Piazzolo)

TEACHING (Major courses)

Public Economics / Public Finance (Master, Bachelor);

Political Economics / Public Choice (Master, Bachelor);

Microeconomics (Master)

Mathematics for Economists (Master)

EDITORIAL SERVICE

2015 - Associate Editor, *European Economic Review*